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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
LOUISIANA
The National Labor Relations Act specifically exempts from the
term "employer" "any State or political subdivision thereof."' Thus,
the labor-management relations in state and municipal employment
are subject to state and local jurisdiction. Traditionally, states have
been reluctant to grant public employees the collective bargaining
rights enjoyed by private employees under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act but the past decade has witnessed a striking growth in
public sector collective bargaining.' While a majority of states have
responded to employee demands by enacting legislation endorsing to
some degree the right of collective bargaining, Louisiana has not
enacted any general enabling legislation.' The purpose of this Com-
ment is to examine the rights of public employees and employers in
Louisiana to engage in collective bargaining in the absence of legisla-
tive authorization and to examine the collective bargaining agree-
ments reached by these parties.
Employee Right to Organize and Collectively Bargain
Recent decisions indicate that the right of public employees to
form and join labor organizations for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining is protected against government infringement under the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of association.' In Keyishian v.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
2. As of November 1971, legislation in twenty-seven states mandated collective
bargaining at the state or local level. For a complete compilation, see LABOR MANAGE-
MENT SERV. ADMIN., UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE POLICY REGULA-
TIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS: STATUTES, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS
AND SELECTED COURT DECISIONS (1970). See also Executive Order 11491, 3 C.F.R. 451
(Supp. 1970), which expands the rights of federal employees to join unions and engage
in collective bargaining.
3. An exception is La. R.S. 23:890 (Supp. 1964) granting full collective bargaining
rights to municipal transit employees.
4. Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d
137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Teamsters
Public Employees Union Local No. 594 v. City of West Point, 338 F. Supp. 927 (D.
Neb. 1972); United Fed. of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.C.D.), aff'd,
404 U.S. 802 (1971); Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Local
858, American Fed. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo.
1970); Service Employees Int. Union, AFL-CIO v. County of Butler, 306 F. Supp. 1080
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Board of Regents,5 the United States Supreme Court repudiated the
premise that public employment may be conditioned on the surren-
der of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct
governmental action. Subsequent to Keyishian, several courts
granted injunctions and damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of
18716 to public employees discharged from employment on account
of union membership on the theory that such discharge violated the
employees' right of free association.' Statutes prohibiting public
employees from joining labor unions' have also been invalidated
based on a United States Supreme Court decision holding that free-
dom of belief, whether political, religious or economic, is an integral
aspect of the "liberty" assured by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.9
Although criticized as weakening the protected right to organ-
ize,10 it is nevertheless settled that public employees have no constitu-
tional right to require their employers to bargain collectively." The
Seventh Circuit held that
(W.D. Pa. 1969); Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1969);
Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). For an analysis of the
McLaughlin, Woodward and Atkins decisions see Eisener, First Amendment Rights of
Association for Public Employee Union Members, 20 LAB. L.J. 438 (1969).
5. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation of any State . . .subjects. . . any citizen of the United
States .. .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in
equity or other proper proceeding for redress."
7. Orr v. Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Wood-
ward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1968); Local 858, American Fed. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069
(D. Colo. 1970). See also Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La.
1969), where a Louisiana federal district court, while finding no evidence of discrimina-
tion on account of union activities of a teacher, observed that if there had been a
discharge because of union activities, the teacher would have been entitled to a preven-
tative injunction under the rationale of McLaughlin and Woodward.
8. Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). In accord is
Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971), where the court concluded
that a statute prohibiting firemen and police from joining labor unions, while tending
toward the desired impartiality of these groups in times of strife, would not be so
efficacious as to outweigh the impairment of first amendment rights.
9. NAACP v. Alabama, ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
10. See Note, 44 TUL. L. REv. 568 (1970).
11. Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). See also
Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971), where the court in
upholding the constitutional right of police and firemen to join a labor organization,
pointed out that plaintiffs did not contend that the city could be compelled to negoti-
ate with the employee organization.
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there is no constitutional duty to bargain collectively with an
exclusive bargaining agent. Such duty, when imposed, is imposed
by statute. The refusal of [the School Board] to bargain in good
faith does not equal a constitutional violation of plaintiffs-
appellees' positive rights of association, free speech, petition,
equal protection, or due process. Nor does the fact that the agree-
ment to collectively bargain may be enforceable against a state
elevate a contractual right to a constitutional right. 2
However, a recent federal court decision has held that public employ-
ees do have a right to present their demands to employers and consult
with them under the first amendment right to petition government
for a redress of grievances as such conduct involves no significant
abridgment of government freedom of action.':' Any further extension
of collective bargaining rights, however, would require legislative au-
thorization."
Authority of the State to Collectively Bargain in the Absence of
Legislative Sanction
Not only are public employers not constitutionally required to
collectively bargain, but further, their ability to do so in the absence
of legislative authorization is questionable. 5 A major objection to
public employer collective bargaining is that it involves an improper
delegation of discretion over terms and conditions of employment to
employee representatives, resulting in a government by private agree-
12. Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 71 L.R.R.M. 2898 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
13. Newport News Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339
F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972).
14. In certain circumstances, certain public employees may require collective bar-
gaining in the absence of legislative sanction where "a public body might bargain so
universally with unions representing other employees that the denial of the right of
union representation .. .might be considered a denial of equal protection." Beau-
boeuf v. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861, 866 (E.D. La. 1969). However, the court
cautioned that executive officials may exercise some degree of latitude as to whether
they should bargain with different classes of employees.
15. See, e.g., International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala.
642, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964); Wichita Public School Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan.
2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); Local 507, IBEW v. City of Hastings, 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d
822 (1965); Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. International Org., 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d
789 (1965); Turnpike Auth. v. Local 1511, AFSCME, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134
(1964). But see Chicago Division of Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 111. App.
2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (I1. Ct. App. 1966); IBEW v. Town of Farmington, 75 N.M.
393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965). An excellent discussion of the general area is contained in
Dole, State and Local Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Ex-
plicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IOWA L. REV. 539 (1969).
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ment.1" Several courts, however, have concluded that no such illegal
delegation of sovereign authority results since the public employer
retains the discretion to refuse to assent to the proposed terms and
conditions. 7 Another argument advanced against collective bar-
gaining is based on a strict construction of local government powers.
Reasoning that local government entities are limited to those powers
expressly granted, several courts have refused to imply a power to
collectively bargain from expressly granted powers to contract and to
fix wages, hours and conditions of employment. 8 A contrary view was
expressed in one case where the court observed that authorization to
do business necessarily implies the power to make employment con-
tracts. The court reasoned that "[t]o say that thd [school] district
is powerless to enter into one agreement covering the terms of em-
ployment of many of its employees but has the power to enter into
approximately 750 separate negotiations would be incongruity be-
yond reason." 9
A third objection is that a civil service system preempts the
authority of the public employer to collectively bargain." However,
some decisions have voiced the conclusion that there is no preemp-
tion but only a reduction of the subjects of bargaining to those within
the discretion of administrative officials since the statutory rights
16. Fellows v. La Tronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Miami Water Works
Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Wichita Public School
Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); Mugford v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo.
1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
17. IBEW Local 266 v. Salt River Project Agric. Improv. & Power Dist., 78 Ariz.
30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,
83 A.2d 482 (1951). The argument of sovereignty has been characterized as the "man-
agement perogative" issue which proved to be so divisive in early private sector bar-
gaining. Chamberlain, Public v. Private Sector Bargaining, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
GOVERNMENT 11 (1972). The author rejects the sovereignty argument because it is the
policy making rather than the administrative function that involves sovereignty.
18. Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194
(1946); Wichita Public School Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357
(1964); Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. International Org., 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789
(1965).
19. IBEW Local 266 v. Salt River Project Agric. Improve. & Power Dist., 78 Ariz.
30, 38-39, 275 P.2d 393, 399 (1954); accord, Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ.,
138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179
P.2d 294 (1947).
20. Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946); Board of
Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689 (1948); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo.
1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
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created by civil service cannot be varied by agreement." Several ear-
lier decisions denied the power of government to collectively bargain
with its employees on the basis of public policy.22 However, a recent
decision noted that attitudes concerning public employees have
changed radically and adopted the view that the right of employees
to participate in the establishment of working conditions is not con-
trary to public policy. 3
Thus, the power of state and local governments to collectively
bargain in the absence of legislative authorization is, at best, a ques-
tionable one. Moreover, even those decisions which have sanctioned
such voluntary bargaining have emphasized the necessity of legisla-
tion to settle such matters as representation status, subjects of bar-
gaining, unit determination and other procedural and substantive
matters in the bargaining process.24
Collective Bargaining in Louisiana
The Statutory and Judicial Framework
With one narrow exception, no Louisiana statute confers collec-
tive bargaining rights on state and local employees.2 1 Moreover, the
state labor code 6 asserts the public policy of the state to be that
"[n]egotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result from
voluntary agreement between employer and employee."' 27 While the
term "employee" is not defined to exclude those employed by a gov-
ernmental authority, it is doubtful that the legislature intended to
21. Civil Service Forum v. N.Y. Transit Auth., 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151 N.Y.S.2d 402
(Sup. Ct. 1956). While civil service evolved in the late 19th century to ensure that
government employment would be based solely on merit, the role of civil service has
expanded with the passage of time to include supervision of a number of tasks not
related to merit hiring such as training, salary administration, attendance control,
morals, safety and grievances. See Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems,
31 PuB. PER. REv. 108 (1970); Comment, 38 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 826 (1970) for an analysis
of the civil service-collective bargaining conflict.
22. International Union of Operating Eng. v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 642, 163
So. 2d 619 (1964); International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga.
712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962).
23. Louisville Fire Fighters v. Burke, 75 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1970). See also Chicago
Div. of Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Il1. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1966); Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
24. See, e.g., Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347,
147 N.W.2d 358 (1969).
25. Employees of municipally owned or operated public transportation facilities
are granted the right of collective bargaining. LA. R.S. 23:890 (Supp. 1964).
26. LA. R.S. 23:821-90 (1950).
27. LA. R.S. 23:822 (1950):
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confer on public employees the broad organizational and bargaining
rights described in the statute, since it presumes a corporate em-
ployer." Furthermore, a California court has held an identical provi-
sion of the California labor code 9 to be inapplicable to the state and
its political subdivisions, interpreting the objective of the legislation
to be the improvement of the status of labor in private industry. 0
The jurisprudence indicates that no right to collectively bargain
in the absence of legislative authorization exists. For example, in
Beauboeuf v. Delgado College,3" a federal district court concluded
that "Louisiana law as interpreted by its Attorney General, neither
commands municipal corporations to, nor prohibits them from, bar-
gaining collectively with unions representing groups of municipal
employees." 2 (Emphasis added.) A state district court reached the
same conclusion with respect to the state's authority to collectively
bargain. Thus, while state and local employees in Louisiana cannot
require their employers to collectively bargain, governmental entities
are not prohibited from collectively bargaining by law. Further, while
the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil service over terms and condi-
tions of employment has been held not to preempt the authority of a
state agency to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with an
employee representative, contract provisions are necessarily subor-
dinate to the controlling civil service authority. 4 Thus negotiable
items are limited to those areas within the discretion of administra-
tors.
Despite the absence of legislative authorization and the existence
of a comprehensive civil service system, several state institutions
have entered into collective bargaining agreements with employee
unions.3 5 Their stated purpose is to enable employees to bargain
28. Id. The statute states that the underlying reason for the stated policy is the
disadvantage imposed on the unorganized worker who, in dealing with corporate em-
ployers, is unable to obtain acceptable terms of employment.
29. CALIF. LABOR CODE § 923 (Deering 1964).
30. Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (Cal. Ct. App.
1946). The court observed that the reasoning of the legislature in enacting the statute
is that oppression occurs in the field of private industry due to the incentive for
personal gain whereas this incentive is not found in public employment.
31. 303 F.,Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1969).
a2. Id. at 864.
33. Zbozen v. Department of Highways, Civil No. 1-163480 (19th D. La., July 6,
1973).
34. Id.
35. The contracts hereinafter relied upon include those contracted by American
Federation of State County and Municipal Employees with Southeastern Louisiana
College (Local 489) [hereinafter cited as Southeastern], Charity Hospital of Louisiana
1973]
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through the union with regard to wages, hours and conditions of
employment within the provisions of the civil service system and to
promote the general efficiency of agency operations."
Representational Status of the Union
In the contract, the employee representative is recognized as the
exclusive bargaining agent" of all "employees" who are generally
defined to include all agency employees except the director and pro-
fessional staff"8 of the agency. Privileges accompanying exclusive rec-
ognition include union access to bulletin boards and to the employer
premises during working hours provided that there is no interference
with the employees' duties. 9 Furthermore, the agency agrees to deal
with all accredited representatives of the recognized union, granting
time off with pay during working hours to union stewards to settle
grievances in the area of their jurisdiction upon the approval of their
supervisor.4 0 There currently is no practice of ascertaining the
strength of employee support for the exclusive representative as a
prerequisite to the conferral of recognition.
The granting of exclusive recognition to a majority representa-
tive of employees tends to effectuate the contract purpose of promot-
ing harmonious and efficient operations as it is generally recognized
that exclusive recognition eliminates disruptive competition among
at New Orleans (Local 1991) [hereinafter cited as Charity of New Orleans], Southwest
Charity Hospital (Local 715) [hereinafter cited as Southwest], Southern University
of Baton Rouge (Local 927) [hereinafter cited as Southern], and Louisiana Highway
Department proposed contract (Local 17) [hereinafter cited as Highway Dept.].
These are on file at the Louisiana State Department of Civil Service in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
36. Southeastern p. 1, Southern p. 1, Highway Dept. p. 1, Southwest p. 1. The
preamble of the Charity of New Orleans agreement describes the purpose as the promo-
tion of harmonious relations between employer and union, the establishment of equita-
ble and peaceful procedures to resolve differences, and the establishment of rates of
pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment.
37. Southeastern art. I, p. 1; Highway Dept. art. I; p. 1; Charity of New Orleans
art. II; p. 1; Southwest art. I, p. 1.
38. For example, Southeastern art. I excludes as employees faculty members,
departmental heads, appointees and elected officials; Charity of New Orleans art. I,
p. 1 excludes the director, physicians, nurses, technicians, private personnel guards
and department heads; Highway Dept. art. I, p. 1 excludes the director, all positions
above section head, engineers and surveyors, attorneys with the stipulation that any
employee may become a union member and be represented on an individual basis.
39. Southeastern art. XVII, p. 9; Highway Dept. art. XV, p. 16; Southwest art.
XIII, p. 13. In some instances, approval of the agency director is required.
40. Southeastern art. III, p. 2; Highway Dept. art. IV, p. 3; Charity of New Orle-
ans art. V, p. 4; Southwest art. IV, p. 3.
19731 COMMENTS
rival unions." The right to confer exclusive recognition and its at-
tendant privileges on a union selected by a majority of employees has
been approved in several decisions.2 Nevertheless, to the extent ex-
clusive recognition is adopted in public employment there is a com-
mensurate diminution in the freedom of individual employees and of
nonrecognized organizations. 3 In two recent decisions involving
school employees, such interference with first amendment rights was
regarded as insignificant in light of the compelling state interest in
maintaining the orderly functioning of the schools and in the effective
representation by the majority union which might otherwise be dis-
rupted by inter-union competition.44
Several decisions have approved union shop agreements and con-
certed activities to achieve them in the private sector even in the
absence of majority support. 5 In these cases, however, the constitu-
tional issue was not reached since state action was not involved.
Instead, the court's sanction of a nonmajority union shop was based
41. Oberer, The Future of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 20 LAB.
L.J. 771 (1969); Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment
Labor Legislation, 67 MicH. L. REV. 891, 901-02 (1969); Comment, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
1004 (1970). These articles emphasize exclusive recognition as a prerequisite of a viable
bargaining process especially in public employment where problems would be acute
due to the necessity of agreement prior to budget deadlines. Recognition of a union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in a governmental unit is prohibited by
only two states and is provided for by a majority of state statutes authorizing collective
bargaining in public employment as well as by Executive Order. 1149, 3 C.F.R. 451
(Supp. 1970), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970). However, the salutory effect of exclusive recogni-
tion in the absence of majority support of the exclusive bargaining agent is
questionable.
42. Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D.
Del. 1971); Local 858, American Fed. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Colo. 1970); Minn. Fed. of Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347,
147 N.W.2d 358 (1969); Chicago Div. Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App.
2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966); State Bd. of Regents v. United Packing
House Food and Allied Workers, Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970).
43. Steele & Louisville v. NRA, 323 U.S. 192 (1944). A grant of exclusive recogni-
tion precludes a non-recognized union from negotiating a labor agreement in behalf of
employees and generally involves a conferral of exclusive privileges such as access to
bulletin boards or employer facilities on the recognized union.
44. Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D.
Del. 1971); Local 858 American Fed. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
45. Englund v. Chavez, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457 (1972); Petri Cleaners
Inc. v. Auto. Employees, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 349 P.2d 76 (1960). See also Messner v.
Journeymen Barbers Int. Union, 53 Cal. 2d 873, 351 P.2d 347 (1960); Shafer v. Reg.
Pharm. Union, 16 Cal. 2d 379, 106 P.2d 273 (1940).
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on the laissez-faire labor policy of the state." While exclusive recogni-
tion does not inhibit public employees per se in the exercise of their
first amendment right to form, join and assist labor organizations, the
absence of majority support might unduly discourage the rights of
association of non-union employees and thus may be attacked as an
overly broad means of achieving the objective of labor peace.47 Fur-
thermore, the grant of exclusive recognition to a nonmajority union
should be measured against the equal protection requirement that
the privilege be reasonably related to attainment of a permissible
objective."' The equal protection requirement would not be satisfied
because absence of majority support for an exclusive representative
of employees would result in labor strife rather than the desired goal
of labor peace." A recent Louisiana district court decision invalidated
the conferral of exclusive recognition by the State Department of
Highways on a nonmajority employee representative. The court did
not consider the first amendment and equal protection arguments
but held the state's action to be arbitrary and capricious in light of
its finding that only one-third of the agency employees supported the
union.50
Another problem involving the representational status of a pub-
lic union in Louisiana is the determination of an appropriate unit for
purposes of collective bargaining51 No legislative guidelines exist for
46. Englund v. Chavez, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457 (1972).
47. Support for this proposition is derived from the continually expanding appli-
cation of the constitutional precept that a state may not utilize broadly drafted legisla-
tion in a field of activity which touches constitutionally protected rights. Increasing
substance to freedom of association is given through the overbreadth doctrine. United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers,
377 U.S. 288 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Moreover, while the denial of rights of communica-
tion to a non-majority exclusive bargaining agent serves a compelling state interest of
promoting labor peace which justifies interference with first amendment rights, Local
858, American Fed. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo.
1970), there may be no compelling interest to justify such interference in the absence
of majority support.
48. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1946).
49. In Local 858, American Fed. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp.
1069 (D. Colo. 1970), the court suggested that the strict test of equal protection must
be met where the use of school facilities was denied to a minority union, but held that
a compelling state interest in labor peace justified the classification which admittedly
circumscribed the exercise of a constitutional right.
50. Zbozen v. Department of Highways, Civil No. 1-163480 (19th D. La., July 6,
1973).
51. See note 35 supra.
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the formation of a unit of public employees. In practice, state employ-
ees are organized on an agency or institution-wide basis. Employees
represented by the union include all those employed by the agency
with the exception of those holding professional and managerial posi-
tions.' Two criteria generally relied on in assessing the appropriate-
ness of governmental units are the existence of an identifiable com-
munity of interest among the employees, and the power of the em-
ployer to conclude an agreement covering terms and conditions of
employment.5 3 The department-wide unit of Louisiana employees
does not meet these criteria. While state agency employees admit-
tedly share a degree of interest by virtue of their common employ-
ment, the diversity of occupational groups included within a depart-
mental unit and the failure to exclude those employees who occupy
supervisory, confidential or personnel positions reduces the cohesive-
ness among unit employees.54 Furthermore, the choice of a depart-
ment unit is questionable because agency directors lack authority to
conclusively determine wages, hours and working conditions of those
employees subject to the civil service system. In view of the lack of
cohesiveness and the overall inability of the agency director to deter-
mine working conditions, the stated purpose of the agreements, i.e.,
to afford the employees the right to collectively bargain, is not being
fully implemented through departmental collective bargaining.
Subjects of Collective Bargaining
Within the framework of the civil service system, subjects of
collective bargaining are restricted to those within the administrative
discretion of agency directors. 5  Employee representatives have, how-
52. See note 38 supra.
53. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS PUB. A. 379, § 13 (1965); N.Y. Civ, SERV. LAW
§ 207 (McKinney Supp. 1968). In its 1968 Report and Recommendations the Gover-
nor's Commission to Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania urged that the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit be determined pursuant to statutory guidelines
such as a community of interest among unit members, protection against the fragmen-
tation of bargaining units and the recognition that units should be structured to corre-
spond to the governmental agencies with whom they will deal.
54. State public employer-employee relations statutes in other jurisdictions gen-
erally exclude supervisory and confidential employees from units of employees. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-471 (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-
1101.2301 (1935); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81 (Supp. 1970-71).
55. Collective bargaining between public employers and representatives of non-
classified state and local employees, such as teachers, is not subject to the constitu-
tional and legislative provisions of the Civil Service System nor to Civil Service Regu-
lations. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.
19731]
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ever, exercised a measure of influence in this area. With respect to
wage determination, while the parties merely follow the constitu-
tional requirement in considering comparable pay in private indus-
try, 6 the employer does agree to consult with the union on revision
and proposal of pay plans to be jointly submitted to the Department
of Civil Service. 7 Regular working hours in collective bargaining
agreements are those prescribed by Civil Service Regulations and
overtime is also defined in accordance with Civil Service Regula-
tions. 8 However, employees working overtime are granted the right
to choose between compensatory leave and overtime pay, a choice
otherwise left to employer discretion under Civil Service Regulations
in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. 9 Furthermore,
the employing authority is required to check off union dues of em-
ployees signing payroll deduction cards0 as he is authorized, but not
required, to do under Louisiana law." Pay increases are merit step
increases prescribed by Civil Service Regulations.2 However, if a step
increase is not timely granted, the employer must notify, in writing,
employees eligible for such increases of the reason that it was not
effected." Prior to a general layoff6" or a dismissal of a particular
employee,65 the employer agrees to consult with the union; both dis-
missal and denial of a meritorious step increase are reviewable under
the contract grievance procedure6 whereby the employee may be
56. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(7).
57. Southeastern art. IX, p. 6; Charity of New Orleans art. XI, p. 9.
58. Southeastern art. X, p. 7; Charity of New Orleans art. XII, p. 9; Southwest
art. VIII, p. 11; Southern art. IV, p. 3; Highway Dept. art. IX, p. 12. 20 LA. ST. PER.
MAN. 6.24, 6.25.
59. 20 LA. ST. PER. MAN. 11.29.
60. Southeastern art. II, p. 1; Southern art. I, p. 1; Highway Dept. art. IV, p. 3;
Southwest art. IV, p. 3.
61. LA. R.S. 42:457 (Supp. 1966).
62. See 20 LA. ST. PER. MAN. 6.15.
63. Charity of New Orleans art. X, p. 9; Southeastern art. VIII, p. 6; Southwest
art. IX, p. 11; Highway Dept. art. XI, p. 14.
64. Southwest art. X, p. 12; Highway Dept. art. XII, p. 15.
65. Southeastern art. VI, p. 6; Charity of New Orleans art. VIII, p. 7.
66. Southeastern art. IV, p. 2; Southern art. III, p. 2; Highway Dept. art. VI, p.
5; Charity of New Orleans art. VI, p. 5; Southwest art. V, p. 4. The State Civil Service
Department prescribes a grievance procedure for state agencies to process those griev-
ances arising in a day-to-day relationship between the employer and employee rather
than those grievances appealable to the Civil Service Commission under rule 13.10.
(20 LA. ST. PER. MAN. 13.10). The latter include removal of a permanent employee for
cause, demotion of a permanent employee, politicial, religious, or racial discrimina-
tion, suspension without pay as a disciplinary action or assignment of unsatisfactory
pay increases. The contract grievance procedure is not limited to a particular type of
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represented by a union representative through several levels of appeal
with final discretion resting with the agency director. Agency promo-
tional policies which require the employer to fill vacancies from the
next lower level of classification in the unit on the basis of seniority
are jointly determined by the employer and the union.67 Finally, the
union is forbidden to sanction or cause strikes among the employees."
Thus, it is clear the limitations imposed on the parties by Civil Serv-
ice Regulations preclude employees from realizing the purpose of
collective bargaining agreements, i.e., the right to bargain through
the union.
Conclusion
The past decade has witnessed a striking growth in public em-
ployee organization and collective bargaining at the state, local and
federal levels of government employment. Public employees in Louis-
iana have not participated fully in the determination of working con-
ditions due to two major shortcomings of the collective bargaining
process. These are the organization of employees into inappropriate
bargaining units and the inability of employers to conclusively deter-
mine working conditions of civil service employees. Both problems
arise because the bargaining unit is not structured to correspond to
the government agency with which it deals. A possible solution would
involve collective bargaining between the civil service director and
employees organized into occupational units. Nonetheless, a viable
collective bargaining process is unattainable in the absence of legisla-
tive authorization due to the questionable authority of public em-
ployers to engage in collective bargaining and the necessity of legisla-
tive guidelines to establish procedural and substantive issues in-
volved in the collective bargaining process. Thus if Louisiana state
and local employees are to effectively participate in the formation of
terms and conditions of employment, legislation authorizing public
employee collective bargaining and establishing guidelines to achieve
a viable bargaining process is in order. Such legislation is desirable
not only because it would enable employees to participate effectively
grievance, but if appeals are not brought to the Civil Service Commission within 30
days from their occurrence the right to appeal to the Commission is forfeited. 20 LA.
ST. PER. MAN. 13.12.
67. Southeastern art. V, p. 5; Southern art. II, p. 1; Highway Dept. art. VIII, p.
9; Charity of New Orleans art. VII, p. 7; Southwest art. VII, p. 7.
68. Southeastern art. XVI, p. 8; Highway Dept. art. XIII, p. 15; Charity of New
Orleans art. III, p. 2; Southwest art. XI, p. 12.
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in collective bargaining but also because of its deterrent effect on
labor strife caused by employee demands for recognition and collec-
tive bargaining.
Susan Weeks Anthony
